

DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE GESELLSCHAFT

61ST KÖNIGSWINTER CONFERENCE

SCHLOSS NEUHARDENBERG,
19-20 MAY 2011



STAYING SECURE IN A CHANGING
WORLD: GLOBALISATION, RESOURCES,
BUDGETS



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft and the UK Koenigswinter wish to express their thanks to the following for their generous support:

- ▶ Auswärtiges Amt
- ▶ British Embassy
- ▶ RWE AG
- ▶ UK Koenigswinter

Warm thanks are due to Holger Friedrich for drawing up the conference report.



*Matthew Kirk, Armin Laschet, Jürgen Großmann,
Michael Arthur and Lothar Rühl*



STAYING SECURE IN A CHANGING WORLD: GLOBALISATION, RESOURCES, BUDGETS

- 4** 61ST KÖNIGSWINTER CONFERENCE – PROGRAMME
Thursday, 19 May 2011
Friday, 20 May 2011
- 7** SUMMARY
- 9** CONFERENCE REPORT
Economic Security
Social Security
Security and Defence
Winding-up Address
- 27** THE KÖNIGSWINTER CONFERENCE
German Steering Committee
UK Koenigswinter
- 29** THE DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE GESELLSCHAFT
Administration Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft
- 30** ADMINISTRATION UK KOENIGSWINTER

STAYING SECURE IN A CHANGING WORLD: GLOBALISATION, RESOURCES, BUDGETS

THURSDAY, 19 MAY 2011

20:00

Opening of the Conference by the Chairmen

Jürgen Großmann, CEO, RWE and *Ambassador*

Sir Michael Arthur, Chairman, British Koenigswinter
Committee

Dinner given by *Wolf-Ruthart Born*,

State Secretary of the German Foreign Office

Address

Speakers:

Quentin Peel,

Peter Nonnenmacher

FRIDAY, 20 MAY 2011

9:00 – 10:15

Plenary session

Address by *Chairman Jürgen Großmann* and

by *Chairman Michael Arthur*

Introduction of the Chairmen of the Study Groups

into the topics of their group

General discussion

10:15 – 10:45

Break for coffee and tea

10:45 – 12:30

The Conference divides into three working groups

Group A: Economic Security

Group B: Social Security

Group C: Security and Defence



12:30 – 14:00

Lunch

Speaker: *Lord Green of Hurstpierpoint*,
Minister of State for Trade and Investment

14:30 – 16:00

Continuation of group discussions

16:00 – 16:30

Break for coffee and tea

16:30 – 17:45

Concluding plenary

Reports from the Study Groups followed
by general discussion

Winding-up address by Rt Hon Ben Bradshaw MP

Concluding remarks by the Chairmen

18:00

Transfer to Berlin

20:30

Dinner

hosted by the *British Ambassador Simon McDonald*
at his Residence, HÖHMANNSTRASSE 10
14193 BERLIN (GRUNEWALD)

Group A

Economic Security

Chairman: *Matthew Kirk*

Rapporteur: *Karen Horn*

- ▶ How do the rapidly changing structures of the world economy and world trade impact on our economic perspectives and on our living conditions? What are our expectations? What steps do or should we take nationally and in the EU-context?
- ▶ In view of the growing international demand, how do we secure the necessary resources for our economies long-term?
- ▶ Do the British and the German national long-term energy concepts provide a sustainable and secure energy mix? What role for the EU?
- ▶ How do high public and private indebtedness affect our economic and budgetary prospects?

Group B

Social Security

Chairman: *Armin Laschet*

Rapporteur: *David Goodhart*

- ▶ Can we still guarantee a fair society in the future?
Is equality better for everyone?
- ▶ Do the drastic steps taken by governments to reduce the budget deficits threaten social cohesion and undermine political participation and support for democratic structures?
- ▶ Given the demographic trends (ageing, shrinking) and the budget constraints, what will social security look like in our countries in 5-10 years? What are the political implications?
- ▶ Is migration a solution or a problem?
Can we learn from each other's experience?

Group C

Security and Defence

Chairman: *Lothar Rühl*

Rapporteur: *Stuart Croft*

- ▶ What are the new threats to our countries?
What response do we need?
- ▶ How do we finance that response?
Will this force us to do more together?
- ▶ Does the Strategic Concept give a new meaning to NATO?
- ▶ How should the NATO-Russia relationship/cooperation be shaped and developed?

SUMMARY

- ▶ Relations between the UK and Germany are very good, both governments work closely and cooperatively together. Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Cameron have established a close personal working relationship but there are important, even fundamental differences on a number of issues, not only on European integration.
- ▶ On Libya, the German abstention from voting with her allies and the Western world in the UN Security Council raised serious questions – not only with British participants – about Germany's foreign policy and the future of a common European foreign and security policy (Germany's „Sonderweg“?); a strong bilateral French-British military and political cooperation as a consequence leaves Germany apart.
- ▶ We have no real peace and no real war; we are now all the time between both. We need therefore a rational and balanced use of military and non-military tools. The most important part of NATO's agenda is the antimissile defence programme which should possibly be developed with Russia.
- ▶ The UK has a strong interest in a quick resolution of the EURO-crisis and a strong EURO in which Germany is considered to have a leading role. Her steps taken so far are viewed too hesitant and too reactive. A challenge for Britain would be more integration in the EURO-zone and thus a two-speed EU.

-
- ▶ Germany's economic performance was to be admired and was considered a role model for Britain's grave economic and budgetary problems.
 - ▶ German reactions to the nuclear incident in Japan and the spontaneous exit from nuclear energy raises on the British side many questions not least with regard to costs, energy security and European energy policy. Britain is unlikely to adopt a similar approach.
 - ▶ Demographic changes and ageing will affect Germany more than Britain (higher birth-rates, growing population). The integration of immigrants is a problem for both countries, with the UK doing slightly better. Core questions are how institutions can be created that generate fairness and a sense of belonging and identification for both newcomers and resident citizens. But basically immigrants need to integrate into the existing system and the society and speak the language of the country they migrate to.

The 61st German-British Königswinter Conference took place at Schloss Neuhardenberg close to the German-Polish border from 19-20 May 2011. Apart from the daily routines of politics and business some 50 Germans and Britons came together to share views and news on domestic, European and global issues. Against the background of a world in motion which is reshuffling common grounds and certainties, the participants confronted the challenge to focus on the multipolar theme of security: economic security, social security as well as security and defence. These issues set the ground for a lively and stimulating debate which revealed clear differences on a number of points between both countries.



*Peter Altmaier,
Michael Arthur*

After a warm welcome given by the host of the dinner session, Wolf-Ruthart Born, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, the two chairmen of this year's Königswinter Conference Jürgen Großmann and Sir Michael Arthur opened the conference with some introductory remarks pointing out the importance of British-German relations for both countries in a more and more globalised world.

Jürgen Großmann argued for a synchronised European approach on energy supply, welcomed the more fact-oriented British approach and called for keeping an eye on costs. Growing government interventions and subsidies into the economic field could make it difficult to return to a free and competitive market.

Sir Michael referred to the dramatic changes we are going through and to the fact that German and British approaches are quite different in many regards: the euro crisis, the Arab spring, Libya, Russia or energy supply.



In the UK nuclear energy is not a controversial issue; the focus is rather on education, national health, economic performance and budget. In contrast, Germany is economically booming. He called for learning from each other and for looking for joint policies and asked the rhetorical question: Will globalisation or the euro crisis make us move closer together or grow further apart?

German-British differences became most apparent on:

- ▶ Firstly, the nuclear crisis in Japan: The UK reaction was phlegmatic (for the British it was not a second Chernobyl), however, Germany replied with a dramatic shift on nuclear energy.
- ▶ Secondly, the euro-zone crisis: The UK has a strong interest in a strong euro but is not a member. The hesitant German response raised a number of questions and doubts.
- ▶ Thirdly, the Arab spring in Northern Africa: The UK hopes to transform the political and economic system of these countries. In the British view, a blood bath in Bengasi would have been a shock to Europe and it would have stopped the process of reform in other North African countries. However, Germany decided to stay apart and even abstained from voting with the Western world.

Many British questions focussed on these issues and called for clarification. It became apparent that Germans tend to take a more "romantic" or normative approach to political change while the British are more pragmatic and fact based. However, the discussions showed that answers and solutions are not clear cut.

During the opening dinner Quentin Peel from the Financial Times and Peter Nonnenmacher from the Frankfurter Rundschau gave insights on Germany and the UK respectively on the basis of their longstanding experience living in Germany or in the UK respectively for many years.

Peel stressed that the unified Germany has changed significantly over the recent years, although the former economic giant is still the European powerhouse and highly embedded into Europe. However, changes are quite dramatic on the domestic

level: the predominant three party system of Western Germany has developed into a five party system in the unified Germany. For the first time, Germany has with Angela Merkel a female chancellor though her governing style with regard to her own party, the

conservatives, is reminiscent of Helmut Kohl. While the divide between left and right is vanishing, political liberalism has become part of all the parties. This has lead finally to the collapse of the liberal party FDP. In Peel's view, the unified Germany has become a world power which still has to live up to its new responsibilities and its position on the global scale.



*Matthew Kirk,
Gebhardt
von Moltke*

Peter Nonnenmacher, in his turn, drew a picture of dramatic change in the UK over the past three decades. In the early 1980s the UK was marked by protests against racism, allegations of police violence, industrial conflict, growing unemployment, and a feeling among the people to have been abandoned. When Charles and Diana got married, tourists and money from Europe were highly welcome but nothing more. In the meantime, in particular with the political emergence of New Labour, the attitudes have changed and brought with them a considerably less prejudiced view of the European Union. Dramatic changes have taken place in Britain: devolution, with Scotland and Wales forming their own administrations and Republicans and Unionists in Northern Ireland sitting down working and governing together in one administration. All in all, Britain has become a more tolerant society, an easier and more pleasant place to live in, a place of considerable racial harmony and relative equality, where civil partnerships are now taken for granted. In Nonnenmacher's view, the political and societal changes in the 80s have led to a renewed British self-confidence and mark the end of a



Peter Altmaier, Lothar Rühl, Michael Arthur

painful post imperial period. The downside of this dramatic change, however, is a more diverse society in terms of wealth distribution and empowerment in the society. Britain suffers from a heavy group of permanently unemployed people, mainly from the old traditional working class regions. Although Britain is unlikely to go back to the difficult 1980's days, the country faces the challenge of matching the expectations of its people, especially with a view to constraints imposed by the global financial and economic crisis.

ECONOMIC SECURITY

The conference working group on economic security chaired by Matthew Kirk discussed the challenges for the Western model and its future in the light of Asian countries' emergence on the global scale, the current state of the euro-zone with a view to the sovereign debt crisis and energy supply. The chairman set the scene for the discussion by stating that the euro has been successful so far. The common currency was good for northern Europe but was it also good for the southern countries? Are they not too different? Europe should stand closer together. We have the choice of an economy of scale or a fragmented one. However, does standing together mean that we have to develop a compensation mechanism?

The current debt and currency crisis seems to suit Germany well, better than Britain. However, having the choice of an economy of scale or a more fragmented one, the euro-zone crisis shows that Europe has to come closer together. Whether Europe is going to create a transfer union or not depends on how much competitiveness is at stake. Besides debt and competitiveness Europe also has to face the consequences of fundamental problems such as an ageing society, energy shortages, access to resources and raw material as well as food and drinking water.

The lively discussion focussed on the following: Economists knew from the beginning, but it was somehow forgotten or neglected by politicians that one cannot have a common currency without a common fiscal and economic government. Although interest in further integrating Europe is low, the debt crisis demands for more integration in terms of economic governance. Therefore the current situation is likely to create tensions between the countries of the euro-zone. Possible solutions to the current sovereign debt crisis could be:

One, weak countries could leave the euro-zone. This appears rather unlikely because it does not solve the problem in its core but could lead to the end of the euro. In particular, with respect to Greece it could create some kind of political or even military turmoil that nobody would want or could control.

Two, debt restructuring and massive structural reforms including wage and price reductions. However, economically required cuts of wages and prices would need to be roughly at about 30 to 40 %, which would not be a realistic option, either. Three, a permanent financial transfer, which Germans call the "transfer

union", could work as remedy. An argument in favour of it was that the countries that have benefited from the union would then compensate for their economic. Solidarity with those partners that are not competitive may be politically justified, but economically there would be severe downsides to the whole euro-zone, even for a country like Germany, in terms of fewer investments and lower growth rates. A speedy solution of the debt crisis might therefore be a compromise combining a permanent transfer with debt restructuring.



*Mark Leonard,
Georg
Boomgaarden,
Richard Lambert*



The more important question of the debt crisis, however, is what it implies for the future of the EU. The emergence of a stronger and more formalised economic governance among the countries of the euro-zone means that the EU is developing at two different speeds with a much more institutionalised EU and more interference for the 17 EU members of the euro-zone. These new emerging rules are not going to be founded within the treaties but are rather intergovernmental deals. As the treaties do not provide for any direction, pragmatic solutions have to be worked out for this difficult situation. The concept of permanent transfers would also point to the democratic deficit, the legitimacy problem of the EU as long as there is not one European nation. If there is a need for transfers, parliaments will want to and should maintain their right to control their budgets. There cannot be an automatism in this respect.

The strong emergence of a more intergovernmental two-speed approach in European policy-making is a big challenge for all members but in particular for Britain.

A form of economic governance just for the euro-zone rather than for the European Union as a whole is going to leave Britain outside in quite a lot of critical debates about the future of the euro-zone. Therefore, the UK ought to stop thinking that it is not part of the crisis. Abstention in this case is no means to achieve a better result. For example, the reform of the stability mechanism will be relevant for private investors.



If private investors would have to bear part of the burden it would have an impact on the financial sector of the City of London. Thus, a combination of restructuring and a form of fiscal transfer seems to be inevitable in order to keep the euro-zone as well as the EU as a whole on track.

*Volker Beckers,
Neil Carmichael*

On the wider international scene, talking about the future and about the big political and economic powers in the world and whether the Western model will survive, one first aspect comes to mind that the US have probably made themselves too dependent on China, possibly a slippery slope. Of course, the dependence goes both ways. However, the US and the Western world have more to lose. Questions come to mind whether the Western model of free markets has reached its peak or has even passed it. As a consequence, are we going to enter a new era of protectionism? In the international institutions it is realistic that the West will lose some of its influence. Our value system will no longer be dominant as such and we will have to take into account the interests and priorities of other – developing and emerging – countries. This will lead to a re-balancing of economic and political power as well as to new forms of co-operation. Economic security in the future therefore means that we will have to

work out new rules for the global economy jointly, which would create a new economic order which helps us all to prosper. The current energy situation after Fukushima calls for new approaches and solutions. However, Germans seem to react more strongly than the British to the nuclear energy challenge, maybe because the Greens play a stronger and more relevant role within party politics in Germany. We all expect that the energy supply is affordable, always available, environmentally friendly and its production widely accepted by the population. It is difficult to meet all of these criteria at the same time. While Brits look at the costs and efficiency in the first place, the debate in Germany is driven by a kind of romantic dream and by the hope that renewables can replace nuclear energy. Conventional power plants will be needed as well. One big problem with renewables is that we still lack the capacity to store the energy. Another key challenge is real-time supply and the long-distance transportation of energy, which is costly as the appropriate infrastructure has to be built. Therefore the energy bill of each customer will have to increase, which in the end will have an impact on every private household's budget and on industry in general and on the competitiveness of the economy as a whole. The economic impact of the shift from nuclear energy to renewable energy is still completely underestimated. A solution might lie in a common energy policy by the EU. However, given the different structures of energy supply and the different views on how the energy market should be run, this is rather a very long-term approach. Governments and politicians in general tend to have a short-term approach, which means that further conflicts are bound to occur.



Stewart Wood, Antje Hermenau

SOCIAL SECURITY

The conference working group on social security, chaired by Armin Laschet, addressed the core question whether Western societies will be able to guarantee a fair society in the future and whether the drastic steps taken by governments to reduce budget deficits threaten social cohesion. In his introductory remarks, the chairman felt that they would do so if cuts and burdens were spread unequally. He also argued that only an adequate education could guarantee equal chances and not money allocation. He pointed to the fundamental changes and challenges which are due to occur in view of expected demographic developments. We would therefore need to encourage migration but the problem is that public opinion is against it.

Three main themes were discussed with regard to social security: immigration, the ageing society and the future of the welfare state.



There was a general understanding that Britain has done somewhat better than Germany on integration. Germany started to think about integration considerably later than Britain. In Britain, some of the larger immigrant groups, such as Indian Hindus, black Africans

or Chinese, do a lot better than Muslim groups such as Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who continue to cope quite poorly with the British society. The debate made it apparent that the majorities in both societies have more to lose than the immigrants do by getting integration wrong or by failing to introduce immigrants into our society in the right way. The core question is how we can create institutions that generate fairness and a sense of belonging and identification both for newcomers and for existing citizens. Key requirements would be: Firstly, people need to speak the language of the country they migrate to.

Secondly, they need to obey domestic written and unwritten law. Thirdly, people need to have the chance to make their fortune in order to pay for their living and taxes. In sum, they need to integrate into the system and the society. However, this is easier said and postulated than done and implemented. In our liberal societies in Germany



Gebhardt von Moltke, Michael Arthur

and Britain it seems to be too easy not to engage, not to join in, which leads many immigrants to keep out of participation and engagement. Arguably, segregation is actually getting worse, certainly in Britain. Another problem is that both our countries, each of them in its own way, have been rather unclear throughout long periods about their national identity; therefore the opportunity has been missed early on to formulate clear offers to immigrants. This is a problem which still exists in a way in both countries. In Germany, the difficulty to accept the idea of dual citizenship adds to the problem.

Since the year 2000, Britain has been introducing citizenship ceremonies, citizenship tests and language tests; adopting these forms of civic engagement from America, Canada and Australia where they have been practised for many decades. Germany is now finally taking similar measures and developing its own approach. The demographic changes in our societies through immigration and ageing are a silent process but the result will be quite fundamental. They will have a deep impact on societal structures and our social security network. The problem of an ageing society is more an issue in Germany than in Britain. The reason for it might be that the British population is growing through immigration and through higher birth rates while the ageing Germany is shrinking at the same time. Not only in Germany, but even in Britain the welfare state is under severe pressure.



*Simon
McDonald,
Richard
Lambert,
Gisela Stuart*

Both suffer from an ageing society as the costs for public health and pensions have increased dramatically thus putting severe budget constraints on public spending. In addition, the costs for education have grown as well.

Immigration and the welfare state are another difficult relationship. There exists a general view that immigrants have to "earn citizenship". This is probably a bigger issue in Britain than it is in Germany, because the UK has a more common-pool welfare system which is tax based rather than a pay-as-you-go insurance-based welfare system as it exists in Germany. Due to both immigration and competitiveness social welfare states come under constraint. Therefore, many fundamental reforms have been undertaken in both countries. In Britain existed for a long time the illusion that it was possible to preserve no link between contribution and benefit; by now this has been almost completely abolished. People now should only get support if they have paid for it. The German welfare system is more generous and does preserve a certain standard of living while the British system tends to be more residual. However, in Germany inequality is also increasing with regard to economic living conditions due to difficulties with the access to the labour market and to education. There is yet no public debate on this. It was a general conclusion that societies are much healthier and happier and suffer from fewer social problems if they are in essence equal.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The third working group discussed security and defence affairs chaired by Lothar Rühl. In his introductory remarks the chairman pointed out that we live at a time of no real peace and no real war. We are likely to be in between both for now. Therefore, a balance of military and non-military tools is required to preserve security. A central question is whether there can be a time axis for the use of these tools. Tools are useful only if they are used rationally. However, in our decisions we are mostly driven by sentiment (fear) not by a rational approach. This is also true for the question how we will get out of Afghanistan and what kind of a situation we will leave behind. Another great challenge for the Western world is that a dozen new countries are trying to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. The anti-missile defence programme is therefore the most important part of today's NATO agenda. Is it possible to develop it together with Russia? And there is another big threat, cyber warfare, to which it is difficult to react and which can have a widespread paralyzing effect in our countries, for instance on health, on energy supply, and also on the military. If it is linked to terrorism it can create anarchy and great insecurity.



The discussion agreed that instead of talking of “new threats”, it would be better to think in terms of unexpected events which cannot be predicted and, very importantly, which one cannot scale ahead of time. We have to be able to recover fast with our tools and means in order to respond at short delay to those unexpected events. Therefore a more holistic concept of resilience is needed. In a number of ways our open societies are rather vulnerable societies. We have to be worried about domestic cohesion, about the cohesion of Europe, about the cohesion of transatlantic relations and we have to be worried about our vulnerability by threats such as interruptions to trade routes, interruptions of energy supply or by the privatisation of violence, and of course by terrorism. This new focus on security as the unexpected



*Uwe Franke,
Quentin Peel*

event, not something that can necessarily be strategically planned for, led the discussion to consider the importance of thinking about the speed of events. Libya is such an example because of its global impact and because of its dynamics with regard to the speed of movement in some of these sets of security issues. The strange peace-war condition in which we live at present provides the context for all operations. At the same time as our armed forces are fighting in Afghanistan to help create civil structures, the public at home does not feel that they are at war. In the same sense, the measures of counterterrorism around us make us feel to be somehow at the war, but not quite at war. We have now lived in this strange social condition for several years.

There was general agreement that in the future Europeans will be forced to operate more together and to pool resources. In the context of Libya, the US have allowed the Europeans to come to the fore, they have even pushed Europe to the fore. However, Germany's passivity there was



deplored and its abstention was seen as forcing the pace of Franco-British bilateralism. Germany, it was said, should pay more attention to the direction, the speed and the depth of the Franco-British defence and security relationship. There was great concern about what Libya meant for the solidarity within the EU and what it meant for mutual reliability, an important aspect for any effort to share capabilities together.

The discussion about NATO and the strategic concept led to the question: What do we mean by strategic interests? After an exchange on what to understand by strategic interests, who has them, who defines them and how they may change, there was agreement that territory, population, access to resources and reliable trade routes, issues of stability, of predictability, and fundamental values were all part of the definition of strategic interests with values being at the heart of it. But having strategic interests does not necessarily mean to intervene nor to turn to the military. We need to think rather more about strategic interests as a way of weighing our options, understanding the limits to our possibilities and to our actions. Bearing major threats and the notion of unexpected events in mind, risk awareness and risk assessment should be a crucial part when we define strategic interests.

Focussing on interests, to cooperate with Russia on issues such as arms control, missile defence, energy, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle-East terrorism was considered a necessity.

These important agenda items can only really and successfully be pursued with some form of cooperative relationship with Russia. This is in the Russian interest as well. Cooperating with us, the EU, is an important part of Russia's modernisation drive. At the same time one should not underestimate the current Russian disinterest in and perhaps also mistrust of further deeper, closer NATO-Russia relations.

It was also suggested to think about the need of a variety of coherent strategic dialogues with China and India with possible debates about security issues.

WINDING-UP ADDRESS



Ben Bradshaw

The closing winding-up address was given by Ben Bradshaw MP, a longstanding Königswinter attendee, whose love affair with Germany began nearly 40 years ago, when he came to Germany for the first time on a school exchange from Norwich to the Rhineland. This was a period when Germany was living of the back of the „Wirtschaftswunder“ and a time with some disturbing

socio-pathological circuits created by the Baader-Meinhof group. Britain then was the sick man of Europe, riven by political, economic and social division. Then in the years 1989/1990 the wall came down and unification occurred. Although it was masked by the euphoria and the challenge of unification, there was a doubted uncertainty about the success and the sustainability of the German model.

Britain at the same time changed dramatically as well: it experienced in that period an ascendancy of free-market fundamentalism and of something that was culminating in phrases and concepts such as "third way" and "cool Britannia" which led finally to Britain's successful bid for the



*Matthew Kirk,
Peter Altmaier*

Olympics in 2012. But recently then came the crash again. While Britain today is stuck in a crisis, a second „Wirtschaftswunder“ can be observed in Germany and the miracle of the German „Mittelstand“: On the one hand, a new German renaissance with its green-tinged pacifism and on the other hand Britain with anxiety in the doldrums talking about rebalancing the economy.

In the historical context these pendulum swings allow for Königswinter to differentiate between passing fads and fashions and genuine trends, social and economic changes and to work to identify effective policy responses.

There were old and new themes at this year's conference: the familiar old German romanticism on nuclear energy, German romanticism on Libya and on the response to Bin Laden's death, which could be described by the term "Sonderweg". On the UK side it is always about our semi-detachment, our tradition and familiar themes on defence. Europe's failure to bat let alone at its weight, but to continually bat below its weight. Our common failure to rise to the security challenges which could lead to anarchy and insecurity. Our relative impotence on the international stage when it comes to pressing problems like the Middle-East peace process, the shift of power from West to East, and the imbalance not just in the global economy, but in the European economy.

The traditional themes of German savers and British borrowers and of course the euro crisis and our response to it. New models for social security based on social mobility rather than equality. The whole discussion whether happiness should be based just on the economic bottom line or whether there are other trends and things that matter more. Time will tell whether these new themes and trends will be fashions or fads, or whether they are genuine changes.

Bradshaw concluded that the conference again has shown that there is still a role for Königswinter. The sort of frank, honest, self-searching expression and exploration of views and a groping towards some answers and some work in progress is invaluable for all of us, but particularly for those of us who are responsible for policy formation. Britain and Germany, both countries, are considerably better places now than they were 20 years ago.



David Goodhart, Peter Nonnenmacher

THE KÖNIGSWINTER CONFERENCE

The Königswinter Conference was established in 1950 with the aim of improving the troubled relationship between Germany and Great Britain. It takes its name from the Rhineside town opposite Bonn where the Conference took place initially. Since then the Conference has convened once a year bringing together German and British politicians, diplomats, business managers, academics and journalists for a profound exchange of views. Königswinter has created bonds and friendships helping to improve the understanding of policy differences on topical issues and challenges and to work towards common approaches.

The issues discussed over the years have ranked from security policy, the Atlantic alliance, European integration, the future of the welfare state, education policy and the integration of ethnic minorities to international economic policy. The Conference is held alternately in Germany and Great Britain. The 62nd Conference will take place in Oxford in March 2012.

GERMAN STEERING COMMITTEE

Dr Hans-Peter Bartels MdB

Dr Uwe Franke

Antje Hermenau MdL

Philipp Mißfelder MdB

Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke

Matthias Naß

Sven Rawe

Prof. Dr Eberhard Sandschneider, Chairman

Dr Rainer Stinner MdB

UK KOENIGSWINTER

Honorary President:

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Robertson of Port Ellen GCMG

Patrons:

Rt. Hon. Baroness Neville-Jones DCMG;

Rt. Hon. David Willetts MP

Directors:

Sir Michael Arthur KCMG

Nik Gowing

Dr Heather Grabbe

Greg Hands MP

Matthew Kirk

Professor William Paterson OBD

Neil Sherlock

Gisela Stuart MP

Company Secretary:

Jackie Newbury

THE DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE GESELLSCHAFT

The Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft wants to work towards a closer relationship between Germany and Great Britain and to improve their mutual understanding.

The Gesellschaft aims to

- ▶ initiate and support debate on political, economic, cultural and social issues of concern to both countries
- ▶ help overcome mutual prejudices and encourage British-German friendship
- ▶ strengthen and promote European co-operation and the transatlantic relationship in co-operation with its British partners.

The Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft is a non-governmental, non-party, independent organization which organizes lectures and conferences since 1949. Its Königswinter Conference has a high reputation and has been the model for many other bilateral conferences.

ADMINISTRATION DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE GESELLSCHAFT

Deutsch-Britische Gesellschaft e.V.
Christl Reissenberger, Conference Organisation
Susanne Schneider, Conference Assistance
Cornelia Neumann, Conference Assistance
Pariser Platz 6
10117 Berlin
Fon +49 (0) 30 203 985 11
Fax +49 (0) 30 203 985 16
creissenberger@debrige.de

ADMINISTRATION UK KOENIGSWINTER

Jackie Newbury
306 Cinnamon Wharf
24 Shad Thames
London SE1 2YJ
Fon +44 (0) 20 7357 6801
Fax +44 (0) 20 7357 6832
jackienewbury@yahoo.co.uk

IMPRINT

HERAUSGEBER/PUBLISHED BY

DEUTSCH-BRITISCHE GESELLSCHAFT E.V.

PARISER PLATZ 6

10117 BERLIN

FON +49 30 203 985 0

FAX +49 30 203 985 16

HEADOFFICE@DEBRIGE.DE

WWW.DEBRIGE.DE

GRAPHIC CONCEPT, DESIGN AND PRODUCTION

www.mediendesignbuero.com

